SVID:202511090002Pending assignmentSummary
An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in the SigenCloud station home API allows an authenticated user to read the station profile of any other user by changing the stationId parameter. The endpoint GET /device/owner/station/home returns the station owner's real name, full home address, GPS coordinates, serial number and energy-system configuration without verifying that the requesting account owns the station.
Because stationId values are predictable and sequential, an attacker can enumerate them and harvest personal data (name + home address + location) and energy-system details at scale. The leaked system UUID and device identifiers can then be chained with the public developer API to read device serial numbers and live telemetry.
Handling Timeline
Vulnerability reported
The IDOR issue in the station home API was reported to the Sigenergy Security Incident Response Team by Dennis Kussendrager and the DIVD team.
Fix deployed & verified
Sigenergy remediated the issue by adding server-side object-level authorization checks to the station home endpoint. The fix has been verified.
Affected Products / Components
| Component | Endpoint / URL | Environment |
|---|---|---|
| Device owner — station home API | GET /device/owner/station/home | Production (EU) |
| Developer open API — device list | GET /openapi/system/{uuid}/devices | Production (EU) |
| Developer open API — real-time info | GET /openapi/systems/{uuid}/devices/{id}/realtimeInfo | Production (EU) |
https://api-eu.sigencloud.com
Vulnerability Description
The GET /device/owner/station/home?stationId=… endpoint returns the full station profile — station name, display name, street address, GPS coordinates, country, time zone, serial number, model version, and PV/battery capacity — for the requested stationId. The endpoint performs no authorization check to confirm that the authenticated user owns (or is otherwise entitled to) the station being queried.
Because stationId values are predictable and sequential, an attacker can enumerate them and retrieve other customers' personal data. The response also exposes the systemUuid, which is accepted by the public developer API to list devices (/openapi/system/{uuid}/devices) and read live telemetry (/openapi/systems/{uuid}/devices/{id}/realtimeInfo).
Data observed in the returned profile includes (values redacted):
stationName— customer surnameaddr— full home address (street, postal code, city, country)longitude/latitude— precise home coordinatesstationSnCode— device serial numberpvCapacity,batteryCapacity— system configuration
Root Cause
- Missing object-level authorization. The API trusts the client-supplied
stationIdwithout verifying ownership or access rights (Broken Object Level Authorization, BOLA). - Predictable identifiers.
stationIdvalues are sequential, enabling trivial enumeration. - Over-exposure of PII. The endpoint returns personal data (name, address, GPS) in addition to the technical fields required by the app.
CVSS v4.0 Scoring
The report assigns a CVSS v4.0 Base Score of 7.1 (High).
| Metric | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Exploitable over the internet. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | Only the stationId parameter changes. |
| Attack Requirements (AT) | None | No special preconditions. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | Low | A single authenticated user account. |
| User Interaction (UI) | None | No victim interaction required. |
| Vulnerable System Confidentiality (VC) | High | Discloses PII (name, address, GPS) at scale. |
| Vulnerable System Integrity (VI) | None | No data modification. |
| Vulnerable System Availability (VA) | None | No availability impact. |
| Subsequent System Confidentiality (SC) | None | No impact beyond the vulnerable component. |
| Subsequent System Integrity (SI) | None | No impact beyond the vulnerable component. |
| Subsequent System Availability (SA) | None | No impact beyond the vulnerable component. |
Technical Details / Proof of Concept
Step 1 — Query your own station
As an authenticated user, request your own station profile:
Step 2 — Change stationId to another user's station
Replace stationId with a different, predictable value:
Step 3 — The server returns the other user's data
Impact
A successful attack exposes sensitive personal and operational data of Sigenergy customers:
- Personal data disclosure — real names, full home addresses and precise GPS coordinates of station owners.
- Mass enumeration — sequential
stationIdvalues allow harvesting the entire customer base. - Device intelligence — serial numbers, PV/battery capacity and live energy usage via the chained developer API.
- Physical-safety risk — home locations of owners of energy systems are exposed.
Remediation & Recommendations
- Enforce object-level authorization. Verify on the server that the authenticated user owns (or is authorized for) the requested
stationIdbefore returning data. - Use non-enumerable identifiers (e.g. UUIDs) or add per-object access tokens where practical.
- Minimize the response payload. Return only the fields the client actually needs and mask PII unless strictly required.
- Apply the same checks to the developer API (
/openapi/…) and any other endpoint that accepts asystemUuidor device identifier.
Additional hardening (recommended)
- Add rate limiting and anomaly detection on
stationIdenumeration. - Keep audit logs for cross-tenant access attempts.
- Run periodic object-level authorization (BOLA) testing across all tenant-scoped endpoints.
References
- Affected endpoint:
https://api-eu.sigencloud.com/device/owner/station/home - Developer API documentation:
https://developer.sigencloud.com - Weakness:
CWE-639(Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key) - OWASP API Security Top 10 2023 —
API1:2023(Broken Object Level Authorization)