Vulnerability Report

Insecure Direct Object Reference in Station Home API

SVID:202511090002 · CVSS 7.1 · High · Disclosed November 9, 2025
Report ID
SVID:202511090002
Severity
High
CVSS v4.0 Score
7.1 / 10
CVE ID
Pending assignment
Disclosure Date
November 9, 2025
Exploitability
High
Attacker Value
High
Status
Fixed
Affected Component
SigenCloud — Device Owner Station API
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in the SigenCloud station home API allows an authenticated user to read the station profile of any other user by changing the stationId parameter. The endpoint GET /device/owner/station/home returns the station owner's real name, full home address, GPS coordinates, serial number and energy-system configuration without verifying that the requesting account owns the station.

Because stationId values are predictable and sequential, an attacker can enumerate them and harvest personal data (name + home address + location) and energy-system details at scale. The leaked system UUID and device identifiers can then be chained with the public developer API to read device serial numbers and live telemetry.

Handling Timeline

November 9, 2025

Vulnerability reported

The IDOR issue in the station home API was reported to the Sigenergy Security Incident Response Team by Dennis Kussendrager and the DIVD team.

November 20, 2025

Fix deployed & verified

Sigenergy remediated the issue by adding server-side object-level authorization checks to the station home endpoint. The fix has been verified.

Affected Products / Components

ComponentEndpoint / URLEnvironment
Device owner — station home API GET /device/owner/station/home Production (EU)
Developer open API — device list GET /openapi/system/{uuid}/devices Production (EU)
Developer open API — real-time info GET /openapi/systems/{uuid}/devices/{id}/realtimeInfo Production (EU)
Backend host: https://api-eu.sigencloud.com

Vulnerability Description

The GET /device/owner/station/home?stationId=… endpoint returns the full station profile — station name, display name, street address, GPS coordinates, country, time zone, serial number, model version, and PV/battery capacity — for the requested stationId. The endpoint performs no authorization check to confirm that the authenticated user owns (or is otherwise entitled to) the station being queried.

Because stationId values are predictable and sequential, an attacker can enumerate them and retrieve other customers' personal data. The response also exposes the systemUuid, which is accepted by the public developer API to list devices (/openapi/system/{uuid}/devices) and read live telemetry (/openapi/systems/{uuid}/devices/{id}/realtimeInfo).

Data observed in the returned profile includes (values redacted):

  • stationName — customer surname
  • addr — full home address (street, postal code, city, country)
  • longitude / latitude — precise home coordinates
  • stationSnCode — device serial number
  • pvCapacity, batteryCapacity — system configuration

Root Cause

  • Missing object-level authorization. The API trusts the client-supplied stationId without verifying ownership or access rights (Broken Object Level Authorization, BOLA).
  • Predictable identifiers. stationId values are sequential, enabling trivial enumeration.
  • Over-exposure of PII. The endpoint returns personal data (name, address, GPS) in addition to the technical fields required by the app.

CVSS v4.0 Scoring

The report assigns a CVSS v4.0 Base Score of 7.1 (High).

MetricValueMeaning
Attack Vector (AV)NetworkExploitable over the internet.
Attack Complexity (AC)LowOnly the stationId parameter changes.
Attack Requirements (AT)NoneNo special preconditions.
Privileges Required (PR)LowA single authenticated user account.
User Interaction (UI)NoneNo victim interaction required.
Vulnerable System Confidentiality (VC)HighDiscloses PII (name, address, GPS) at scale.
Vulnerable System Integrity (VI)NoneNo data modification.
Vulnerable System Availability (VA)NoneNo availability impact.
Subsequent System Confidentiality (SC)NoneNo impact beyond the vulnerable component.
Subsequent System Integrity (SI)NoneNo impact beyond the vulnerable component.
Subsequent System Availability (SA)NoneNo impact beyond the vulnerable component.

Technical Details / Proof of Concept

Step 1 — Query your own station

As an authenticated user, request your own station profile:

# the user's own stationId GET /device/owner/station/home?stationId=12025082900279 HTTP/2 Host: api-eu.sigencloud.com

Step 2 — Change stationId to another user's station

Replace stationId with a different, predictable value:

# another customer's stationId — no ownership check GET /device/owner/station/home?stationId=12025082900276 HTTP/2 Host: api-eu.sigencloud.com

Step 3 — The server returns the other user's data

HTTP/2 200 OK Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8 {"code":0,"msg":"success","data":{...,"stationName":"[REDACTED]","addr":"[REDACTED], Netherlands","longitude":"[REDACTED]","latitude":"[REDACTED]","stationSnCode":"[REDACTED]","pvCapacity":5.50,"batteryCapacity":16.12,...}}
Attack vector assessment: high. A single authenticated account can enumerate all stations and harvest owner names, home addresses and GPS coordinates, then chain into the public developer API for serial numbers and live telemetry.

Impact

A successful attack exposes sensitive personal and operational data of Sigenergy customers:

  • Personal data disclosure — real names, full home addresses and precise GPS coordinates of station owners.
  • Mass enumeration — sequential stationId values allow harvesting the entire customer base.
  • Device intelligence — serial numbers, PV/battery capacity and live energy usage via the chained developer API.
  • Physical-safety risk — home locations of owners of energy systems are exposed.

Remediation & Recommendations

  1. Enforce object-level authorization. Verify on the server that the authenticated user owns (or is authorized for) the requested stationId before returning data.
  2. Use non-enumerable identifiers (e.g. UUIDs) or add per-object access tokens where practical.
  3. Minimize the response payload. Return only the fields the client actually needs and mask PII unless strictly required.
  4. Apply the same checks to the developer API (/openapi/…) and any other endpoint that accepts a systemUuid or device identifier.

Additional hardening (recommended)

  • Add rate limiting and anomaly detection on stationId enumeration.
  • Keep audit logs for cross-tenant access attempts.
  • Run periodic object-level authorization (BOLA) testing across all tenant-scoped endpoints.

References

  • Affected endpoint: https://api-eu.sigencloud.com/device/owner/station/home
  • Developer API documentation: https://developer.sigencloud.com
  • Weakness: CWE-639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key)
  • OWASP API Security Top 10 2023 — API1:2023 (Broken Object Level Authorization)
For questions about this report, or to report a related vulnerability, contact the Sigenergy Security Incident Response Team at csirt@sigenergy.cloud. See our Vulnerability Handling Process for how reports are managed.