Vulnerability Report

HTML Injection in Device-Sharing Invitation Email

SVID:202511090001 · CVSS 5.3 · Medium · Disclosed December 2025
Report ID
SVID:202511090001
Severity
Medium
CVSS v4.0 Score
5.3 / 10
CVE ID
Pending assignment
Disclosure Date
December 2025
Exploitability
Medium
Attacker Value
Medium
Status
Fixed
Affected Component
SigenCloud — Device Sharing Email Notification
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

An HTML injection weakness in the SigenCloud device-sharing invitation email allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML and CSS into the email sent to any target address. The issue arises because the firstName and lastName fields of the owner-sharing API are reflected into the invitation email without sanitization or HTML entity encoding.

An authenticated device owner who shares device ownership with a victim can craft these fields to hide the legitimate email content and display attacker-controlled text, links, and content — turning a trusted Sigenergy notification into a phishing and content-spoofing vector.

Handling Timeline

December 2025

Vulnerability reported

The HTML-injection issue in the device-sharing invitation email was reported to the Sigenergy Security Incident Response Team by Dennis Kussendrager and the DIVD team.

September 2026

Fix deployed & verified

Sigenergy remediated the issue by HTML-encoding user-supplied fields in the invitation email. The fix has been verified.

Affected Products / Components

ComponentEndpoint / URLEnvironment
Device sharing — owner invitation email POST /device/share/owner Production (EU)
Backend host: https://api-eu.sigencloud.com  ·  Email sender: Sigen <notice@sigenergy.cloud>

Vulnerability Description

The device owner-sharing flow invites another user by email. The invitation request includes the fields firstName and lastName, which are intended to personalize the email. These values are concatenated directly into the HTML email template without HTML entity encoding.

As a result, an attacker can submit markup such as <style>, <h3>, <img>, or <a> in these fields, and the markup is rendered as HTML by the recipient's email client.

Root Cause

  • User-controlled fields (firstName, lastName) are embedded into the email HTML without output encoding.
  • No input validation or sanitization is applied to the name fields.
  • The email template does not use auto-escaping (or the escaping is bypassed).

CVSS v4.0 Scoring

The report assigns a CVSS v4.0 Base Score of 5.3 (Medium).

MetricValueMeaning
Attack Vector (AV)NetworkExploitable over the network.
Attack Complexity (AC)LowNo special conditions required.
Attack Requirements (AT)NoneNo specific preconditions required to exploit.
Privileges Required (PR)LowAuthenticated device owner.
User Interaction (UI)NoneInjection occurs without victim interaction.
Vulnerable System Confidentiality (VC)LowPhishing can lead to credential disclosure.
Vulnerable System Integrity (VI)LowEmail content can be modified/spoofed.
Vulnerable System Availability (VA)NoneNo availability impact.
Subsequent System Confidentiality (SC)NoneNo impact beyond the vulnerable component.
Subsequent System Integrity (SI)NoneNo impact beyond the vulnerable component.
Subsequent System Availability (SA)NoneNo impact beyond the vulnerable component.

Technical Details / Proof of Concept

Step 1 — Craft the invitation request

Submit a device-owner-sharing request in which firstName contains an HTML payload:

POST /device/share/owner HTTP/2 Host: api-eu.sigencloud.com Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 {"targetEmail":"test3@sab.re","userId":25082900296,"stationId":12025082900279,"permissions":1,"expiredTimeOptions":1,"firstName":"<style>p{display: none}</style><h3>Phshing</h3>","lastName":". "}

Step 2 — Server accepts the payload

The API returns HTTP 200 and sends the invitation email:

HTTP/2 200 OK Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8 {"code":0,"msg":"success","data":true}

Step 3 — Injected HTML renders in the email

The recipient receives the legitimate invitation "Welcome To mySigen! Please Set Your Password" from Sigen <notice@sigenergy.cloud>. The injected payload renders as HTML:

  • <style>p{display: none}</style> hides all legitimate paragraph text.
  • <h3>Phshing</h3> displays attacker-controlled content as a heading.
  • Further markup (links, images, forms) can be injected to build a convincing phishing page.
Attack vector assessment: moderate. A low-privilege authenticated attacker can automate the invitation flow and target any email address with a spoofed, attacker-controlled message from the legitimate Sigenergy sender.

Impact

A successful attack lets an attacker abuse a trusted Sigenergy notification channel for phishing. Specifically, an attacker can:

  • Hide the legitimate email content and replace it with attacker-controlled text and links.
  • Spoof Sigenergy branding in an email sent from the legitimate notice@sigenergy.cloud sender.
  • Direct victims to phishing pages to harvest credentials or other sensitive data.
  • Target arbitrary email addresses (the targetEmail field is attacker-controlled).

Remediation & Recommendations

  1. HTML-encode all user-supplied fields. Encode <, >, &, " and ' before inserting firstName, lastName and any other user input into the email body.
  2. Use a template engine with automatic context-aware escaping for all outgoing email templates.
  3. Validate and sanitize input. Restrict name fields to a safe character set (letters, spaces, and a limited set of punctuation) and reject markup.
  4. Consider plain-text or strictly-scoped HTML for notification emails, or render user data in a clearly isolated block.

Additional hardening (recommended)

  • Apply a content-security policy (CSP) header to HTML emails where supported.
  • Log and alert on invitation requests containing markup or unusual characters.
  • Review all other email templates that include user-controlled values for the same issue.

References

  • Affected endpoint: https://api-eu.sigencloud.com/device/share/owner
  • Web portal: https://app-eu.sigencloud.com
  • Weakness: CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation) / CWE-80 (Improper Neutralization of Script-Related HTML Tags)
For questions about this report, or to report a related vulnerability, contact the Sigenergy Security Incident Response Team at csirt@sigenergy.cloud. See our Vulnerability Handling Process for how reports are managed.