SVID:202511090001Pending assignmentSummary
An HTML injection weakness in the SigenCloud device-sharing invitation email allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML and CSS into the email sent to any target address. The issue arises because the firstName and lastName fields of the owner-sharing API are reflected into the invitation email without sanitization or HTML entity encoding.
An authenticated device owner who shares device ownership with a victim can craft these fields to hide the legitimate email content and display attacker-controlled text, links, and content — turning a trusted Sigenergy notification into a phishing and content-spoofing vector.
Handling Timeline
Vulnerability reported
The HTML-injection issue in the device-sharing invitation email was reported to the Sigenergy Security Incident Response Team by Dennis Kussendrager and the DIVD team.
Fix deployed & verified
Sigenergy remediated the issue by HTML-encoding user-supplied fields in the invitation email. The fix has been verified.
Affected Products / Components
| Component | Endpoint / URL | Environment |
|---|---|---|
| Device sharing — owner invitation email | POST /device/share/owner | Production (EU) |
https://api-eu.sigencloud.com · Email sender: Sigen <notice@sigenergy.cloud>
Vulnerability Description
The device owner-sharing flow invites another user by email. The invitation request includes the fields firstName and lastName, which are intended to personalize the email. These values are concatenated directly into the HTML email template without HTML entity encoding.
As a result, an attacker can submit markup such as <style>, <h3>, <img>, or <a> in these fields, and the markup is rendered as HTML by the recipient's email client.
Root Cause
- User-controlled fields (
firstName,lastName) are embedded into the email HTML without output encoding. - No input validation or sanitization is applied to the name fields.
- The email template does not use auto-escaping (or the escaping is bypassed).
CVSS v4.0 Scoring
The report assigns a CVSS v4.0 Base Score of 5.3 (Medium).
| Metric | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Exploitable over the network. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | No special conditions required. |
| Attack Requirements (AT) | None | No specific preconditions required to exploit. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | Low | Authenticated device owner. |
| User Interaction (UI) | None | Injection occurs without victim interaction. |
| Vulnerable System Confidentiality (VC) | Low | Phishing can lead to credential disclosure. |
| Vulnerable System Integrity (VI) | Low | Email content can be modified/spoofed. |
| Vulnerable System Availability (VA) | None | No availability impact. |
| Subsequent System Confidentiality (SC) | None | No impact beyond the vulnerable component. |
| Subsequent System Integrity (SI) | None | No impact beyond the vulnerable component. |
| Subsequent System Availability (SA) | None | No impact beyond the vulnerable component. |
Technical Details / Proof of Concept
Step 1 — Craft the invitation request
Submit a device-owner-sharing request in which firstName contains an HTML payload:
Step 2 — Server accepts the payload
The API returns HTTP 200 and sends the invitation email:
Step 3 — Injected HTML renders in the email
The recipient receives the legitimate invitation "Welcome To mySigen! Please Set Your Password" from Sigen <notice@sigenergy.cloud>. The injected payload renders as HTML:
<style>p{display: none}</style>hides all legitimate paragraph text.<h3>Phshing</h3>displays attacker-controlled content as a heading.- Further markup (links, images, forms) can be injected to build a convincing phishing page.
Impact
A successful attack lets an attacker abuse a trusted Sigenergy notification channel for phishing. Specifically, an attacker can:
- Hide the legitimate email content and replace it with attacker-controlled text and links.
- Spoof Sigenergy branding in an email sent from the legitimate
notice@sigenergy.cloudsender. - Direct victims to phishing pages to harvest credentials or other sensitive data.
- Target arbitrary email addresses (the
targetEmailfield is attacker-controlled).
Remediation & Recommendations
- HTML-encode all user-supplied fields. Encode
<,>,&,"and'before insertingfirstName,lastNameand any other user input into the email body. - Use a template engine with automatic context-aware escaping for all outgoing email templates.
- Validate and sanitize input. Restrict name fields to a safe character set (letters, spaces, and a limited set of punctuation) and reject markup.
- Consider plain-text or strictly-scoped HTML for notification emails, or render user data in a clearly isolated block.
Additional hardening (recommended)
- Apply a content-security policy (CSP) header to HTML emails where supported.
- Log and alert on invitation requests containing markup or unusual characters.
- Review all other email templates that include user-controlled values for the same issue.
References
- Affected endpoint:
https://api-eu.sigencloud.com/device/share/owner - Web portal:
https://app-eu.sigencloud.com - Weakness:
CWE-79(Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation) /CWE-80(Improper Neutralization of Script-Related HTML Tags)