SVID:202412060001Pending assignmentSummary
An unauthorized access vulnerability in the SigenCloud MQTT broker at mqtt**-eu.sigencloud.com allows any anonymous client to connect, subscribe to and publish messages on ports 1883 (plaintext) and 8883 (TLS) — without any username, password or client-certificate authentication.
Because MQTT carries device telemetry and control traffic, an attacker who connects anonymously can read every device message, inject forged commands, and disrupt the messaging infrastructure — a full confidentiality, integrity and availability compromise with no prior credentials.
Handling Timeline
Vulnerability reported
The unauthorized MQTT broker access was reported to the Sigenergy Security Incident Response Team by the Sigenergy Cybersecurity Red Team.
Fix deployed by Sigenergy Cloud
The Sigenergy Cloud department remediated the issue by enforcing mandatory MQTT authentication and access control on both ports, and disabling anonymous connections.
Fix re-verified
The remediation was re-verified on December 10, 2024. Anonymous connections are now rejected and the broker requires valid credentials on ports 1883 and 8883.
Affected Products / Components
| Component | Host | Ports | Environment |
|---|---|---|---|
| SigenCloud MQTT Broker | mqtt**-eu.sigencloud.com | 1883 (MQTT/TCP), 8883 (MQTT/TLS) | Production (EU) |
mqtt**-eu.sigencloud.com:1883 and mqtt**-eu.sigencloud.com:8883
Vulnerability Description
The production MQTT broker accepted anonymous connections — no username/password and no client certificate were required on either the plaintext port 1883 or the TLS port 8883. An unauthenticated client could connect, subscribe to all topics (including the # wildcard) and publish arbitrary messages to any topic.
Root cause
- The MQTT broker was configured with anonymous access enabled (no authentication backend enforced).
- No Access Control List (ACL) restricted which topics a client could subscribe to or publish on.
- The TLS port 8883 provided transport encryption only — encryption was mistaken for authentication, so the broker remained open to anonymous clients.
Impact
- Information disclosure — an attacker can subscribe to
#and read all device telemetry, status, and configuration messages. - Device control / message injection — an attacker can publish forged control commands, causing unauthorized device operations.
- Denial of service — an attacker can flood the broker with messages, disrupting the messaging infrastructure.
CVSS v4.0 Scoring
The report assigns a CVSS v4.0 Base Score of 9.3 (Critical).
| Metric | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Exploitable over the internet. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | The broker accepts anonymous connections directly. |
| Attack Requirements (AT) | None | No special preconditions. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | None | No account or credentials are required. |
| User Interaction (UI) | None | No victim interaction required. |
| Vulnerable System Confidentiality (VC) | High | All device messages can be read via anonymous subscription. |
| Vulnerable System Integrity (VI) | High | Forged control messages can be published to devices. |
| Vulnerable System Availability (VA) | High | The messaging infrastructure can be flooded and disrupted. |
| Subsequent System Confidentiality (SC) | None | No impact beyond the vulnerable component. |
| Subsequent System Integrity (SI) | None | No impact beyond the vulnerable component. |
| Subsequent System Availability (SA) | None | No impact beyond the vulnerable component. |
Technical Details / Proof of Concept
Step 1 — Connect anonymously to the broker (no credentials)
Step 2 — Subscribe to every topic and observe device traffic
Step 3 — Publish forged messages without authentication
Impact
- Information disclosure — complete exposure of device telemetry, status and energy data via anonymous wildcard subscription.
- Device control / message injection — forged control commands can be published, enabling unauthorized device operations.
- Denial of service — the broker can be flooded, disrupting message delivery across the platform.
- Mass exploitation — no credentials are needed, so the vulnerability is trivially exploitable at scale.
Remediation & Recommendations
- Disable anonymous access. Reject all connections that do not present valid credentials.
- Enforce authentication on both ports 1883 and 8883 (username/password or, preferably, mutual TLS client certificates).
- Apply Access Control Lists (ACL) so each client can only subscribe to and publish on its own authorized topics.
- Rotate credentials for all devices and services that were exposed during the vulnerable window.
- Monitor for abnormal connections and alert on wildcard (
#/+) subscriptions and high-rate publishing.
References
- Affected host:
mqtt**-eu.sigencloud.com:1883,mqtt**-eu.sigencloud.com:8883 - Weakness:
CWE-306(Missing Authentication for Critical Function) - OWASP Top 10 2021 —
A07:2021(Identification and Authentication Failures)