SVID:202403280001Pending assignmentSummary
An arbitrary user password reset weakness in SigenCloud allows an attacker to take over any user account. The issue combines three flaws:
- A user-existence endpoint discloses valid accounts (account enumeration).
- The digital CAPTCHA can be bypassed with a weak, brute-forceable value.
- The password-reset verification code is only 4 numeric digits and can be brute-forced (0000–9999) without rate limiting or account lockout.
An attacker who knows (or enumerates) a victim's registered email address can reset that account's password without access to the victim's mailbox, leading to full account takeover.
Handling Timeline
Vulnerability discovered & reported
The arbitrary password-reset issue was reported to the Sigenergy Security Incident Response Team.
Fix implemented & deployed
The vulnerability was remediated the same day it was discovered.
Affected Products / Components
| Component | Endpoint / URL | Environment |
|---|---|---|
| Email verification / password reset | POST /admin/user/check/email/verification | Production (EU) |
| User existence check | /admin/user/check/{email} | Production (EU) |
| Login / Forgot Password portal | https://app-eu.sigencloud.com/#/accounts/login | Production (EU) |
| Forgot password — email entry | https://app-eu.sigencloud.com/#/accounts/forget/forget-password | Production (EU) |
| Verification code entry (brute-forced) | https://app-eu.sigencloud.com/#/accounts/forget/verification-code | Production (EU) |
| New password entry | https://app-eu.sigencloud.com/#/accounts/forget/create-new-password | Production (EU) |
https://api-eu.sigencloud.com · Web portal: https://app-eu.sigencloud.com
Vulnerability Description
The password-reset flow can be abused through two complementary paths:
- Enumerate existing accounts. An unauthenticated caller queries the user-existence endpoint with candidate email addresses to determine which accounts are valid.
- Bypass the CAPTCHA and reset the password. The verification-code field accepts a weak, predictable value, allowing the reset request to be submitted without correctly solving the CAPTCHA.
- Brute-force the 4-digit verification code. Because the code space is tiny (0000–9999) and the verification endpoint returns HTTP 200 for every attempt without throttling, the entire space can be enumerated automatically until the correct code is recovered.
Because no effective anti-automation, CAPTCHA enforcement, or rate limiting is in place, an attacker can systematically reset the password of any enumerated account.
Root Cause
- The digital CAPTCHA can be quickly brute-forced and bypassed completely.
- The password-reset verification code is only 4 numeric digits — an extremely small search space.
- The verification endpoint returns HTTP 200 for every attempt, with no server-side distinction of invalid codes.
- Absence of per-IP rate limiting, attempt throttling, or account lockout enables automated enumeration and brute-force.
- The account permission / verification logic is flawed and fragile, allowing the reset flow to be bypassed.
CVSS v4.0 Scoring
The report assigns a CVSS v4.0 Base Score of 8.7 (High).
| Metric | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Exploitable over the network. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | No special conditions required. |
| Attack Requirements (AT) | None | No specific preconditions required to exploit. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | Low | Low-level privileges needed. |
| User Interaction (UI) | None | No victim interaction required. |
| Vulnerable System Confidentiality (VC) | High | Full access to account data. |
| Vulnerable System Integrity (VI) | High | Full modification of account data. |
| Vulnerable System Availability (VA) | High | Account can be locked out from its owner. |
| Subsequent System Confidentiality (SC) | None | No impact beyond the vulnerable component. |
| Subsequent System Integrity (SI) | None | No impact beyond the vulnerable component. |
| Subsequent System Availability (SA) | None | No impact beyond the vulnerable component. |
Technical Details / Proof of Concept
Step 1 — Enumerate valid accounts
Use the user-existence interface to verify that a target account exists:
Step 2 — Bypass CAPTCHA and reset the password
Submit a crafted request to the verification endpoint. The verification code field (vcode) accepts a weak, brute-forceable value, bypassing CAPTCHA validation:
Step 3 — Brute-force the 4-digit verification code
The same password-reset flow can also be abused by brute-forcing the short 4-digit verification code. Because every attempt returns HTTP 200 with no rate limiting or account lockout, the full code space is enumerated automatically.
Open the login page
https://app-eu.sigencloud.com/#/accounts/login
The "Forgot Password?" link leads to the reset flow.
Request a password reset for the victim
https://app-eu.sigencloud.com/#/accounts/forget/forget-password
Enter the victim's registered email — Yin***624@gmail.com — and click Next.
Verification code is issued
https://app-eu.sigencloud.com/#/accounts/forget/verification-code
The portal confirms: "The verification code has been sent to: Yin***624@gmail.com."
Brute-force the verification code
Target: the verification-code submission endpoint (via Burp Suite Intruder)
Every attempt returns HTTP 200 and there is no rate limiting, so the full 4-digit space (0000–9999) is enumerated automatically.
Submit the recovered code
https://app-eu.sigencloud.com/#/accounts/forget/verification-code
The correct verification code — 8363 — is entered and accepted.
Reset the victim's password
https://app-eu.sigencloud.com/#/accounts/forget/create-new-password
A new password is set for Yin***624@gmail.com. The attacker now controls the account.
Evidence — Brute-Force Capture
| Field | Observed value |
|---|---|
| Payload set | 4-digit numeric codes (0000 → 9999) |
| Response status | HTTP 200 for every attempt (no differentiation / no lockout) |
| Response length | 953 bytes (constant) |
| Recovered code | 8363 |
Impact
A successful attack results in a complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for the affected accounts (C:H / I:H / A:H). An attacker can:
- Take over any user account by resetting its password.
- Read, modify, and exfiltrate account data.
- Lock legitimate users out of their own accounts.
- Pivot from a compromised account to further abuse system functionality.
Remediation & Recommendations
Reported fixes
- Use a strong CAPTCHA. Replace the numeric code with an alphanumeric verification code of at least 8 characters (or a one-time reset link delivered by email), and enforce a short validity period with single-use semantics.
- Limit request frequency per IP address. Apply rate limiting to authentication and verification endpoints to block automated enumeration and brute-force attempts.
Additional hardening (recommended)
- Increase the verification-code entropy (6+ digits, or alphanumeric) to enlarge the search space.
- Lock the account or invalidate the code after a small number of failed attempts.
- Return a uniform response for existing and non-existing accounts to prevent enumeration.
- Return uniform error responses and avoid returning HTTP 200 for invalid codes.
- Enforce server-side validation of the verification code and invalidate it after use.
- Add step-up verification (e.g., CAPTCHA) before accepting verification-code submissions.
- Monitor and alert on anomalous verification-request volumes.
References
- Affected endpoint:
https://api-eu.sigencloud.com/admin/user/check/email/verification - Related endpoint:
https://api-eu.sigencloud.com/admin/user/check/{email} - Target portal:
https://app-eu.sigencloud.com - Weakness:
CWE-640(Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password) andCWE-307(Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts)