Vulnerability Report

Insecure Direct Object Reference in Device Signal Write API

SVID:202403220001 · CVSS 8.2 · High · Reported March 22, 2024
Report ID
SVID:202403220001
Severity
High
CVSS v4.0 Score
8.2 / 10
CVE ID
Pending assignment
Reported Date
March 22, 2024
Exploitability
Low
Attacker Value
High
Status
Fixed
Affected Component
SigenCloud — Device Signal Write API
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in the SigenCloud device signal write API allows any authenticated user to write arbitrary signal values to another customer's inverter. The endpoint POST /device/sigen/device/signal/write/batch accepts a deviceSnCode and a stationId without verifying that the requesting account owns the device, so an attacker can replace these identifiers with a victim's values and change that device's parameters — for example, its grid/network code.

Because the identifiers are predictable and sequential, a single authenticated account can target devices at scale, modifying device settings or disrupting operation across the Sigenergy customer base in Europe.

Handling Timeline

March 22, 2024

Vulnerability reported

The IDOR issue in the device signal write API was reported to the Sigenergy Security Incident Response Team by Robert B***.

March 24, 2024

Fix deployed & verified

Sigenergy remediated the issue by adding server-side authorization checks that verify the requesting account owns the target deviceSnCode and stationId. The fix has been verified.

Affected Products / Components

ComponentEndpoint / URLEnvironment
Device signal write API POST /device/sigen/device/signal/write/batch Production (EU)
Backend host: https://api-eu.sigencloud.com

Vulnerability Description

The endpoint POST /device/sigen/device/signal/write/batch writes signal values to a device identified in the request body by deviceSnCode (the inverter serial number) and stationId. The endpoint performs no ownership check: it does not verify that the authenticated user is entitled to control the requested device or station.

An attacker only needs their own valid bearer token. By replacing deviceSnCode and stationId with another customer's values, they can write arbitrary signals to that customer's inverter — for example changing the grid/network code, or writing a signal value that disables a function of the device.

Identifiers observed in the request (values partially masked):

  • deviceSnCode — inverter serial number, e.g. 120240***0006
  • stationId — station identifier, e.g. 120240***0002
  • writeDetailDtos[].signalId / signalValue — the signal to write and its value

Root Cause

  • Missing object-level authorization. The API trusts the client-supplied deviceSnCode and stationId without verifying ownership (Broken Object Level Authorization, BOLA).
  • Predictable identifiers. Device and station identifiers are sequential and enumerable.
  • Write capability without ownership proof. A state-changing endpoint accepts identifiers for any device without validating the account–device relationship.

CVSS v4.0 Scoring

The report assigns a CVSS v4.0 Base Score of 8.2 (High).

MetricValueMeaning
Attack Vector (AV)NetworkExploitable over the internet.
Attack Complexity (AC)LowOnly the deviceSnCode/stationId values change.
Attack Requirements (AT)NoneNo special preconditions.
Privileges Required (PR)LowA single authenticated user account.
User Interaction (UI)NoneNo victim interaction required.
Vulnerable System Confidentiality (VC)NoneNo sensitive data is read back.
Vulnerable System Integrity (VI)HighAttacker can modify device signals and settings.
Vulnerable System Availability (VA)HighAttacker can disrupt or disable device operation.
Subsequent System Confidentiality (SC)NoneNo impact beyond the vulnerable component.
Subsequent System Integrity (SI)NoneNo impact beyond the vulnerable component.
Subsequent System Availability (SA)NoneNo impact beyond the vulnerable component.

Technical Details / Proof of Concept

Step 1 — Authenticate with your own account

Use any valid user session and its bearer token (token partially masked):

# attacker's own bearer token (masked) Authorization: bearer w6501Ty2...hOBS

Step 2 — Target another customer's device

Replace deviceSnCode and stationId with the victim's identifiers (values partially masked):

POST /device/sigen/device/signal/write/batch HTTP/2 Host: api-eu.sigencloud.com Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 {"addr":null,"deviceSnCode":"120240***0006","deviceType":1,"modeVersion":null,"stationId":120240***0002,"stationSnCode":null,"writeDetailDtos":[{"dataType":null,"signalId":2007,"signalSize":null,"signalValue":"0"}]}

Step 3 — The server writes the signal to the victim's device

HTTP/2 200 OK Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8 {"code":0,"msg":"success","data":{"transactionId":null,"stationSnCode":"120240***0006","unsuccessful":false,"signalDtoList":[{"signalId":2007,"signalSize":2,"increase":1,"dataType":6,"signalKey":"","signalValue":"0","deviceType":1,"processType":"","unit":"","itemSignalList":[]}]}}
Attack vector assessment: high. With a single authenticated account, an attacker can enumerate device identifiers and write arbitrary signals to other customers' inverters — for example changing the grid/network code — potentially at scale.

Impact

A successful attack allows an authenticated user to control other customers' energy devices:

  • Device manipulation — modify inverter signals and configuration parameters, including the grid/network code.
  • Service disruption — write values that disable functions or stop the device from operating correctly.
  • Mass exploitation — sequential identifiers allow targeting many devices across the customer base.
  • Regulatory / safety risk — changing the grid code can put the device out of compliance with local grid requirements.

Remediation & Recommendations

  1. Enforce object-level authorization. Verify on the server that the authenticated user owns (or is authorized for) the target deviceSnCode and stationId before writing.
  2. Validate the device–station relationship. Confirm that the supplied deviceSnCode actually belongs to the supplied stationId.
  3. Use non-enumerable identifiers (e.g. UUIDs) or per-object access tokens where practical.
  4. Apply the same checks to all device-control endpoints that accept a deviceSnCode, stationId or similar identifier.

Additional hardening (recommended)

  • Add rate limiting and anomaly detection on cross-tenant write attempts.
  • Keep audit logs of device-control operations for cross-tenant access detection.
  • Run periodic object-level authorization (BOLA) testing across all tenant-scoped write endpoints.

References

  • Affected endpoint: https://api-eu.sigencloud.com/device/sigen/device/signal/write/batch
  • Weakness: CWE-639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key)
  • OWASP API Security Top 10 2023 — API1:2023 (Broken Object Level Authorization)
For questions about this report, or to report a related vulnerability, contact the Sigenergy Security Incident Response Team at csirt@sigenergy.cloud. See our Vulnerability Handling Process for how reports are managed.