SVID:202403220001Pending assignmentSummary
An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in the SigenCloud device signal write API allows any authenticated user to write arbitrary signal values to another customer's inverter. The endpoint POST /device/sigen/device/signal/write/batch accepts a deviceSnCode and a stationId without verifying that the requesting account owns the device, so an attacker can replace these identifiers with a victim's values and change that device's parameters — for example, its grid/network code.
Because the identifiers are predictable and sequential, a single authenticated account can target devices at scale, modifying device settings or disrupting operation across the Sigenergy customer base in Europe.
Handling Timeline
Vulnerability reported
The IDOR issue in the device signal write API was reported to the Sigenergy Security Incident Response Team by Robert B***.
Fix deployed & verified
Sigenergy remediated the issue by adding server-side authorization checks that verify the requesting account owns the target deviceSnCode and stationId. The fix has been verified.
Affected Products / Components
| Component | Endpoint / URL | Environment |
|---|---|---|
| Device signal write API | POST /device/sigen/device/signal/write/batch | Production (EU) |
https://api-eu.sigencloud.com
Vulnerability Description
The endpoint POST /device/sigen/device/signal/write/batch writes signal values to a device identified in the request body by deviceSnCode (the inverter serial number) and stationId. The endpoint performs no ownership check: it does not verify that the authenticated user is entitled to control the requested device or station.
An attacker only needs their own valid bearer token. By replacing deviceSnCode and stationId with another customer's values, they can write arbitrary signals to that customer's inverter — for example changing the grid/network code, or writing a signal value that disables a function of the device.
Identifiers observed in the request (values partially masked):
deviceSnCode— inverter serial number, e.g.120240***0006stationId— station identifier, e.g.120240***0002writeDetailDtos[].signalId / signalValue— the signal to write and its value
Root Cause
- Missing object-level authorization. The API trusts the client-supplied
deviceSnCodeandstationIdwithout verifying ownership (Broken Object Level Authorization, BOLA). - Predictable identifiers. Device and station identifiers are sequential and enumerable.
- Write capability without ownership proof. A state-changing endpoint accepts identifiers for any device without validating the account–device relationship.
CVSS v4.0 Scoring
The report assigns a CVSS v4.0 Base Score of 8.2 (High).
| Metric | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Exploitable over the internet. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | Only the deviceSnCode/stationId values change. |
| Attack Requirements (AT) | None | No special preconditions. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | Low | A single authenticated user account. |
| User Interaction (UI) | None | No victim interaction required. |
| Vulnerable System Confidentiality (VC) | None | No sensitive data is read back. |
| Vulnerable System Integrity (VI) | High | Attacker can modify device signals and settings. |
| Vulnerable System Availability (VA) | High | Attacker can disrupt or disable device operation. |
| Subsequent System Confidentiality (SC) | None | No impact beyond the vulnerable component. |
| Subsequent System Integrity (SI) | None | No impact beyond the vulnerable component. |
| Subsequent System Availability (SA) | None | No impact beyond the vulnerable component. |
Technical Details / Proof of Concept
Step 1 — Authenticate with your own account
Use any valid user session and its bearer token (token partially masked):
Step 2 — Target another customer's device
Replace deviceSnCode and stationId with the victim's identifiers (values partially masked):
Step 3 — The server writes the signal to the victim's device
Impact
A successful attack allows an authenticated user to control other customers' energy devices:
- Device manipulation — modify inverter signals and configuration parameters, including the grid/network code.
- Service disruption — write values that disable functions or stop the device from operating correctly.
- Mass exploitation — sequential identifiers allow targeting many devices across the customer base.
- Regulatory / safety risk — changing the grid code can put the device out of compliance with local grid requirements.
Remediation & Recommendations
- Enforce object-level authorization. Verify on the server that the authenticated user owns (or is authorized for) the target
deviceSnCodeandstationIdbefore writing. - Validate the device–station relationship. Confirm that the supplied
deviceSnCodeactually belongs to the suppliedstationId. - Use non-enumerable identifiers (e.g. UUIDs) or per-object access tokens where practical.
- Apply the same checks to all device-control endpoints that accept a
deviceSnCode,stationIdor similar identifier.
Additional hardening (recommended)
- Add rate limiting and anomaly detection on cross-tenant write attempts.
- Keep audit logs of device-control operations for cross-tenant access detection.
- Run periodic object-level authorization (BOLA) testing across all tenant-scoped write endpoints.
References
- Affected endpoint:
https://api-eu.sigencloud.com/device/sigen/device/signal/write/batch - Weakness:
CWE-639(Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key) - OWASP API Security Top 10 2023 —
API1:2023(Broken Object Level Authorization)